Recent research in international finance has argued that changes in the real exchange rate reflect the difference in marginal utility growth, or stochastic discount factors (SDFs), between foreign and domestic investors. This asset market view of exchange rates, applied to representative agents in the U.S. and the U.K., is encapsulated in the simple equation: growth in real U.S./U.K. exchange rate = U.K. representative agent's marginal utility growth over his consumption basket − U.S. representative agent's marginal utility growth over her consumption basket
This equation has been used to draw inferences about international risk sharing, to characterize risk premia in the foreign exchange market, and to gain insights into exchange rate determination.
1 For example, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) use Eq.
(1), together with asset returns and real exchange rate volatility, to conclude that the marginal utility growth of American and British investors must be highly correlated. They argue that this high correlation in marginal utility growth implies a much higher degree of international risk sharing than does consumption data. We argue that Eq. (1), by itself, is not useful for thinking about how real exchange rates are determined. Moreover, inference about risk sharing cannot rely solely on Eq. (1). Section 1 provides the basis for our argument. We show that Eq. (1) only needs to hold if asset markets are assumed to completely span all of the variation in agents' marginal utility growths. In this case, agents always equate marginal utility growth when it is measured in a common basket of goods (or other numeraire) that they can frictionlessly trade with each other. Thus, when Eq. (1) holds, there are only two possible reasons that marginal utility growth can differ across agents: either it is measured using different baskets of goods (i.e., different numeraires), or it is measured using a common basket of goods that has a different price in the two countries, due to frictions in the goods market. Both of these conditions are rooted in the goods market rather than the asset market.
For example, if American and British agents choose the same consumption basket, then the real exchange rate measures the relative price of this basket of goods across the two countries. To understand changes in the real exchange rate, in this situation, we must understand how goods markets frictions interact with the underlying forces in the economy, to create changes in the relative price of an identical basket of goods across the two countries. If, in addition, asset markets are complete, then any difference in the marginal utility growth of the two representative agents only reflects the change in the relative price of the same consumption basket across the two countries.
Alternatively, if American and British agents choose different consumption baskets, then the real exchange rate can vary because it represents the relative price of different baskets. Here, to understand real exchange rate behavior, we need to know something about how preferences over goods interact with changes in the relative abundance of the different goods in the baskets. Additionally, in this case, we would not want to draw any inference about risk sharing from variation in the real exchange rate. Even if asset markets are complete, so that Eq. (1) applies, marginal utility growths of the representative agents in the U.S. and U.K. can still differ because they are measured over different consumption baskets. In fact, when goods markets are frictionless, the growth in the exchange rate is always equal to any agent's (be they American, British, or otherwise) marginal utility growth measured over units of the U.K. consumption basket minus that same agent's marginal utility growth measured over units of the U.S. consumption basket.
2 This standard change of units (or numeraire) applies irrespective of asset market completeness. More generally, when asset markets are incomplete Eq. (1) does not hold, which is an additional reason why imperfect risk sharing and real exchange rate variation are not one and the same thing. With incomplete markets, the right hand side of Eq. (1) is often reinterpreted as the difference between two SDFs (one for each country). Empirical SDFs are sometimes formed by projecting marginal utility growths in the two countries onto vectors of returns on the same assets, measured in the respective real currency units of the two countries. It is argued, for example, by Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) and Lustig and Verdelhan (2012) , that Eq. (1) holds for these empirical minimum-variance SDFs, even under incomplete markets. In Section 1.2.1 we show that, in fact, Eq. (1) does not generally hold for these minimum-variance SDFs. Additionally, in Section 1.3 we make clear that minimum-variance SDFs provide a measure of shared risk, but are silent on the risks that agents do not share due to asset market incompleteness. In the language of finance, agents may have different marginal utility growths, however, the projection of every agent's marginal utility growth onto the space of asset returns must be identical. It is true that these projections may look different when they are measured in different units, but this result is only because they are identical when measured in common units.
We argue that models and assumptions are needed to explain variation in the real exchange rate. In Section 1.4 we describe the necessary ingredients in any such model. In Section 2 we consider a simple two-country endowment economy, closely based on Backus and Smith (1993) . We assume that agents in these two economies have standard preferences over two goods. One good is frictionlessly traded. We alternatively assume that the second good is not traded, or is frictionlessly traded. In this model, real exchange rate fluctuations arise out of variation in countries' endowments of the two goods. But the exact nature of these fluctuations-the mapping from endowments to consumptions and real exchange ratesdepends crucially on the precise nature of the assumed preference differences, imperfections in goods markets, and imperfections in asset markets.
Our model also shows that the link between risk sharing and real exchange rate variation is tenuous. We construct equilibria with lots of real exchange rate variation combined with perfect or no risk sharing. Similarly, we construct equilibria with no real exchange rate variation combined with perfect or no risk sharing. The weak connection between risk sharing and exchange rate behavior is readily understood if we consider a single economy with two agents, in which all goods have the same prices in all markets. The fact that these agents face the same prices and use the same numeraire does not tell us what the economy's overall risk sharing characteristics are. It only tells us that, if risk is not perfectly shared, goods market imperfections play no role. More generally, no model-free economic inferences about different agents can be made by only observing the prices of assets and goods that they trade at common prices, in a competitive equilibrium.
The literature sometimes uses reduced form models of the marginal utility growths of representative agents in different countries, in conjunction with the asset market view, to investigate the point-by-point behavior of exchange rates. In Section 3 we discuss problems with this approach. First, the reduced form model of the domestic agent's marginal utility growth is often identified using asset returns denominated in real domestic currency units, while the reduced form model for the foreign agent is identified using the same asset returns denominated, instead, in real foreign currency units. The real exchange rate is a necessary input into such exercises, so implications for the real exchange rate cannot be treated as an output as well. Moreover, typical models specify reduced forms that are functions of asset returns. If asset markets are not complete, such models cannot identify the marginal utility growths of representative agents because asset returns do not span the variation in marginal utility growths. Even if asset markets are complete, the list of returns used in the model must completely span variation in the two marginal utility growths. However, papers that in this literature only use a very small subset of the assets that are available for agents to invest in.
Real Exchange Rates
We begin with the standard definition of the real exchange rate between two agents. The agents could be located anywhere in the world, including places that use the same nominal currency to denominate prices (e.g., different countries within the Euro zone, or different states in the U.S.). For convenience, let Amy and Bob be the names of these two agents, and to be concrete, assume that they are the representative agents in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively. We make the standard assumption that there is frictionless trade in nominal currencies so that, without loss of generality, we use U.S. dollars (or any other nominal currency) to denominate the prices of all goods and assets, regardless of their location. If the price of a good or asset is denominated in a different currency, then it can be converted to the U.S. dollar equivalent at the relevant nominal exchange rate.
Let P be the dollar price today in the U.S. of one unit of Amy's consumption basket of goods, and let P be its dollar price next period. Similarly, letP be the U.S. dollar price today in the U.K. of one unit of Bob's consumption basket, and letP be its dollar price next period. The real U.S./U.K. exchange rate, E, is defined as the relative value of a unit of Bob's consumption basket in the U.K. to a unit of Amy's consumption basket in the U.S., E ≡P /P and E ≡P /P .
Empirically, P is usually measured as the dollar price of the basket of consumer goods and services that is used to compute the consumer price index (CPI) in the U.S. Likewise, letP * denote the U.K. pound price of the basket of consumer goods and services that is used to compute the CPI in the U.K. If S is the nominal dollar/pound exchange rate (i.e., the U.S. dollar price of one U.K. pound), thenP ≡ SP * is the U.S. dollar price equivalent of this U.K. basket. Therefore, the usual measure of the growth in the real U.S./U.K. exchange rate is ln(E /E) = ln(P * /P * ) + ln(S /S) − ln(P /P ) .
If the composition of Amy's and Bob's consumption baskets is the same and they face identical prices for the goods in their baskets, then the real U.S./U.K. exchange rate is constant. Therefore, the real U.S./U.K. exchange rate can only vary if either (or both):
1. The composition of Amy's and Bob's consumption baskets is different; or 2. Amy and Bob face different prices, in the U.S. and the U.K., for identical goods in their baskets (where prices are measured in common units such as U.S. dollars).
Thus, to understand why the real exchange rates varies, at a minimum it is necessary to un-derstand why agents may face different prices for identical goods and/or why the composition of their consumption baskets may differ. From an empirical standpoint, both of these conditions for a variable real exchange rate are satisfied for virtually every country pair in the world. Different countries use different baskets of consumer goods and services to compute their respective consumer price indices. Also, identical goods frequently have different prices in different countries (i.e., purchasing power parity does not typically hold across countries, or even in different locations within the same country).
The Asset Market View of Real Exchange Rates
As its name suggests, the asset market (or SDF) view of real exchange rates focuses on the role asset markets play in determining real exchange rates. Consider a set of k assets that can be located anywhere in the world. The standard assumption in this literature is that trade in assets is frictionless, so that Amy and Bob can both trade the same set of k assets at the same prices. Let X be the k × 1 vector of uncertain asset payoffs next period, and let P X be the k × 1 vector of asset prices today. Again, without loss of generality, we assume that the payoffs and prices of all the assets are measured in U.S. dollars.
Let λ be Amy's marginal utility today from an additional unit of her consumption basket, and let λ denote the (uncertain) discounted value of her marginal utility next period. Note that Amy's indirect marginal utility today of an additional dollar is λ/P , since she can purchase 1/P units of her consumption basket with that dollar. If Amy maximizes her expected discounted utility, then her first order condition for optimality (i.e., her Euler equation) implies that
In Eq. (4), 1 denotes a k × 1 vector of 1's, R ≡ X/P X denotes the k × 1 vector of dollardenominated asset returns (using element-by-element division), and E [·] denotes the standard expectations operator. Euler equations are typically used in financial economics to understand cross-sectional variation in the average (or expected ) returns of different assets, based on how those returns covary with the marginal utility growth of agents.
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Analogous to Amy, letλ denote Bob's marginal utility today over a unit of his consumption basket and letλ denote the (uncertain) discounted value of his marginal utility next period. If Bob also maximizes his expected discounted utility, then his first order condition for optimality implies that
If the asset returns in Eqs. (4) and (5) completely span all of the variation in Amy's and Bob's indirect marginal utility growths, then they must always (i.e., in every state of the world next period) equate indirect marginal utility growth, so that
Eq. (6) can be rearranged and written in logs to produce the asset market view of exchange rates in Eq. (1) 
where the real exchange rate is defined by Eq. (2). To be clear, the asset market view of exchange rates in Eq. (7) says that Bob's consumption basket always (i.e., in every state/period) appreciates in value relative to Amy's consumption basket whenever his marginal utility growth is larger than hers, and it always depreciates in value when the opposite is true. In other words, the real U.K. pound always appreciates against the real U.S. dollar whenever times become "worse" in the U.K. relative to the U.S., and vice versa. The recent literature in international asset pricing has made extensive use of the asset market view of exchange rates. For example, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) use Eq. (7) and the volatility of real exchange rates to make inferences about the extent of international risk sharing.
4 Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) argue that the risks of foreign currency investments are determined by differences in agents' marginal utility growths.
We provide a detailed analysis of Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) in Section 1.2. 5 Section IIIB ("Mechanism: Where Do Consumption Betas of Currencies Come From?") of Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) states that:
Investing in foreign currency is like betting on the difference between your own and your neighbor's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS). These bets are very risky if your IMRS is not correlated with that of your neighbor, but they provide a hedge when her IMRS is highly correlated and more volatile.
Likewise, Verdelhan (2010) argues that changes in the real exchange rate are determined by differences in the marginal utility growths of foreign and domestic investors.
6 Other examples of papers that rely on the asset market view of exchanges rates are cited in the first footnote of the introduction. Our main point in this paper is that, alone, the asset market view of exchange rates is not helpful for understanding variation in the real exchange rate. The intuition for our main point is simple. The real exchange rate can only vary if either (or both) the composition of Amy's and Bob's consumption baskets differs, or they face different prices for identical goods in their baskets. Therefore, as we stated earlier, to understand why the real exchange rates varies, at a minimum it is necessary to understand why agents may face different prices for identical goods and/or why the composition of their consumption baskets may differ. However, the asset market view of exchange rates provides no economic insights on either front. In fact, it does not even require a stand on the specific nature of goods markets, but instead relies only on complete asset markets. Indeed, the broad appeal of the asset market view stems from the fact that it only relies on asset markets.
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The following example explicitly illustrates that complete asset markets is not a sufficient condition to understand, or give an economic interpretation to, variation in the real exchange rate. Suppose that Amy and Bob face the same prices in the U.S. and the U.K. for identical goods in their baskets. In this case, Amy can trade one unit of Bob's basket in the U.S. forP /P ≡ E units of her basket. Therefore, her marginal utility from an additional unit of Bob's basket is λE. Likewise, Bob's marginal utility from an additional unit of Amy's basket isλ/E (since, in the U.K., he can trade a unit of Amy's basket for P/P ≡ 1/E units of his basket). Thus, if Amy and Bob face the same prices for identical goods, then they are not uniquely identified in the asset market view of real exchange rates, since an equivalent 6 The introduction of Verdelhan (2010) states that:
When markets are complete, the real exchange rate, measured in units of domestic goods per foreign good, equals the ratio of foreign to domestic pricing kernels. Exchange rates thus depend on foreign and consumption growth shocks. If the conditional variance of the domestic stochastic discount factor (SDF) is large relative to its foreign counterpart, then domestic consumption growth shocks determine variation in exchange rates.
7 For example, in their introduction, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) state: Yet the conclusion (that international risk sharing is better than you think) is hard to escape. Our calculation uses only price data, and no quantity data or economic modeling (utility functions, income or productivity shock processes, and so forth). A large degree of international risk sharing is an inescapable logical conclusion.
economic interpretation of Eq. (7) .
Therefore, when agents face the same prices for identical goods, it is impossible to infer any differences in their marginal utility growths using only the growth in the real exchange rate. Conversely, since the agents are not uniquely identified when they face the same goods prices, growth in the real exchange cannot possibly be determined by differences in their marginal utility growths. Note that the math below the braces in Eq. (8) always holds whenever Eq. (6) holds. However, the economic interpretation provided above the braces in Eq. (8) 
Again, the math below the braces in Eq. (9) holds trivially, but the economic interpretation requires that agents face the same prices for identical goods. Eq. (8) emphasizes two important points. First, Amy and Bob are not uniquely identified in the asset market view of real exchange rates unless they face different prices for identical goods. In other words, complete asset markets is not a sufficient condition to provide a unique economic interpretation to the asset market view of real exchange rates in Eq. (7). At a minimum, it is also necessary to assume that the representative agents face different prices for identical goods. Second, if the composition of Amy's and Bob's consumption baskets differs (which, in empirical implementations, is virtually always the case), then at least a portion of any variation in the real U.S./U.K. exchange rate could simply reflect changes in the relative price of different baskets of goods. At the extreme, if Amy and Bob face identical prices for all goods, then, as Eq. (7) and (8) illustrate, all of the variation in the real exchange rate is accounted for by changes in the relative price of different baskets.
Thus, to understand why the real exchange rate varies, at a minimum it is necessary to understand why agents may face different prices for identical goods and correctly account for any differences in the composition of their consumption baskets (ideally, one would also endeavor to understand why the composition of their consumption baskets differ).
Inferences About International Risk Sharing
In this section we provide a more detailed analysis of Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006). As we mentioned in Section 1.1, they use the asset market view of exchange rates in Eq. (7) to interpret variation in the real exchange rate as evidence that foreign and domestic investors have not shared risk perfectly. To measure the extent of imperfect risk sharing, they take the variance of both sides of Eq. (7). From the abstract of Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006): Exchange rates depreciate by the difference between domestic and foreign marginal utility growth or discount factors. Exchange rates vary a lot, as much as 15% per year. However, equity premia imply that marginal utility growth varies much more, by at least 50% per year. Therefore, marginal utility growth must be highly correlated across countries: international risk sharing is better than you think. Conversely, if risks really are not shared internationally, exchange rates should vary more than they do: exchange rates are too smooth.
What exactly constitutes perfect risk sharing, and how is it related to the difference in agents' marginal utility growths?
First, consider again the example in Section 1.1 in which Amy and Bob face the same prices in the U.S. and the U.K. for identical goods in their baskets. In that example we showed that Amy's marginal utility from an additional unit of Bob's basket is λE, while Bob's marginal utility from an additional unit of Amy's basket isλ/E. Therefore, if asset markets are complete and agents face the same prices for identical goods in their baskets then, in every period, U.S. representative agent's marginal utility growth over U.S. consumption basket ln λ −ln λ = U.K. representative agent's marginal utility growth over U.S. consumption basket
and U.S. representative agent's marginal utility growth over U.K. consumption basket
It is straightforward to extend this analysis to show that, when asset markets are complete, Amy and Bob always equate marginal utility growth over any basket of goods for which they face identical prices. In particular, if Amy and Bob face identical prices for all goods (and services), then with complete asset markets they always (i.e., in every state/period) equate marginal utility growth over any common basket of goods (and services). In this case, Amy and Bob share risk perfectly. However, note that even if Amy and Bob share risk perfectly, their marginal utility growths in Eq. (7) can still differ when they are measured over different baskets of goods (and services). In this case, the real exchange rate can also still vary because it too reflects the relative price of different baskets.
With frictionless trade in assets, risk sharing can only be imperfect if asset markets are incomplete and/or agents face different prices for identical goods. If asset markets are incomplete, then Amy's and Bob's marginal utility growths can differ across states of the world that are not spanned by the available assets. If they face different prices for identical goods, then there must be a friction in the goods market that prevents these prices from being equal in different locations, and that friction may also prevent perfect risk sharing.
Contrary to the premise of Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) , the conditions for imperfect risk sharing do not completely overlap with the conditions for a variable real exchange rate. For example, as we noted earlier, if the composition of Amy's and Bob's consumption baskets is the same and they face identical prices for the goods in their baskets, then the real exchange rate is constant. Yet, risk sharing can still be imperfect if asset markets are incomplete. Conversely, if the asset market is complete and agents face identical prices for the goods in their baskets, then risk sharing is perfect (since they always equate marginal utility growth over any common basket of goods). Yet the exchange rate can still vary if the composition of Amy's and Bob's consumption baskets differs. market frictions that prevent equal prices for identical goods. In other words, under these specific assumptions, both imperfect risk sharing and variation in the real exchange rate can only occur if there are frictions in the goods market. Unfortunately, as Table 1 indicates, the link between risk sharing and the volatility of the real exchange rate only holds in this one special case. As previously noted, the difference in composition of Amy's and Bob's consumption baskets can contribute to variation in the real exchange rate, but it need not affect risk sharing. Likewise, incomplete asset markets can contribute to imperfect risk sharing, without affecting the volatility of the real exchange rate.
To emphasize, if we only observe variation in the real exchange rate, and nothing more, then we cannot be sure of the extent to which that variation reflects goods market frictions versus different baskets of goods. Similarly, incomplete asset markets are a source of imperfect risk sharing, but one cannot learn the extent of market incompleteness (i.e., the extent to which agents' marginal utility growths are not spanned by asset returns) from asset returns alone. Therefore, very specific assumptions are required to make any inferences about international risk sharing using only observations of asset returns and variation in the real exchange rate. Moreover, any such inferences are not robust to different assumptions.
International Risk Sharing with Incomplete Asset Markets
Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) also examine international risk sharing when asset markets do not completely span agents' marginal utility growths. As the basis for their analysis, they claim that, even when asset markets are incomplete, Eq. (7) continues to hold for the linear projections of agents' marginal utility growths onto the available asset returns (denominated in units of their respective consumption baskets).
8 Here, we show that Eq. (7) does not in fact hold for these linear projections.
8 On page 675 of Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) they state that:
These discount factors are the projections of any possible domestic and foreign discount factors onto the relevant spaces of asset payoffs, and they are also the minimum-variance discount factors. We show that Eq. (1) continues to hold with this particular choice of discount factors.
In Section 14.2.2 of Lustig and Verdelhan (2012) they also claim that Eq. (13) holds with incomplete markets. Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2007) also make this claim.
Let m ≡ λ /λ andm ≡λ /λ denote the discounted marginal utility growths of, respectively, Amy and Bob. Let r ≡ RP/P andr ≡ RP /P be the asset returns denominated in units of their respective consumption baskets. Let
denote the linear projections of Amy's and Bob's marginal utility growths onto, respectively, r andr. In Eq. (12), β andβ are k × 1 vectors, and · denotes the dot product of two vectors.
Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) claim that the asset market view of exchange rates in Eq. (7) continues to hold for these linear projections, so that
Eq. (13) does not in fact hold if the number of assets used in the projections is less than the number of possible states of the world. Since, by definition, r ≡rE /E notice that Eq. (13) 
However, in general,r (E /E) 2 is not in the linear span ofr unless there are as many assets as future possible states of the world. To be more explicit, suppose that there are n states of the world next period indexed by z, and letr (z) and E (z) denote the values ofr and E in state z. Then Eq. (14) can be written more formally as
Take any possible value ofβ as given. If the number of securities, k, is less than the number of states of the world next period, n, then Eq. (15) represents n equations in the k unknown elements of β. Therefore, in general, we cannot find vectors β andβ such that Eq. (15) holds. As a consequence, the same can be said of Eq. (13).
Projections onto Asset Returns
In the previous section we showed that Eq. (7) does not hold for the linear projections of agents' marginal utility growths onto the asset returns (denominated in units of their respective consumption baskets). In this section we consider whether it is possible to learn anything about risk sharing using only the projections of agents' marginal utility growths onto the returns of assets that they can frictionlessly trade with each other. Let M ≡ (λ /P )/(λ/P ) andM ≡ (λ /P )/(λ/P ) denote the discounted indirect marginal utility growths of, respectively, Amy and Bob, defined over U.S. dollars. Let
denote the linear projections of Amy's and Bob's indirect marginal utility growth over dollars onto the space of available dollar-denominated asset returns, so that
It is well known that if Amy's and Bob's Euler equations (Eqs. 4 and 5) are both satisfied, then the linear projections in Eqs. (17) and (18) must agree, so that
From these projections we learn that Amy's and Bob's indirect marginal utility growths share a common component, but we learn nothing about the components of their indirect marginal utility growths, ε andε, that are orthogonal to the available asset returns. These include all of Amy's and Bob's risks that go unshared due to asset market incompleteness, as well as any shared risk that happens to not be spanned by the available asset returns (more generally, shared risk not spanned by the returns used in the projections). Simply put, in equilibrium Amy and Bob must agree on the prices of assets and goods that they can frictionlessly trade with each other, and therefore it is impossible to learn where their marginal utility growths differ using only these prices.
Necessary Ingredients in a Model
What are the minimum ingredients required by a model that attempts to explain real exchange rates? As we've already argued, to understand why the real exchange rates varies, at a minimum it is necessary to understand why agents may face different prices for identical goods and/or why the composition of their consumption baskets may differ (or at least correctly account for any differences in the composition of their consumption baskets). Therefore, any model that attempts to explain how real exchange rates are determined must directly specify:
• agents' preferences over goods;
• any frictions in goods market trade that may restrict prices of identical goods from being equal in different locations;
• agents' preferences over time and uncertainty;
• the available assets that agents can trade; and
• endowments or production technology.
These ingredients are required to map structural shocks to endowments (or production technology) into agents' consumption and, hence, outcomes of the real exchange rate. Any model that is missing one of these key ingredients is silent about how the real exchange rate is determined. A number of recent papers omit some of these necessary ingredients, but instead purport to explain variation in the real exchange rate using consumption-based asset pricing models together with the asset market view in Eq. (7). These papers start with aggregate consumption in the foreign and domestic economy and assume a utility function for the representative agent in each economy. For example, Verdelhan (2010) uses representative agents with external habit preferences (see Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) , while Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) uses representative agents with Epstein-Zin recursive utility functions (see Epstein and Zin, 1989) .
As we noted at the beginning of Section 1, the real exchange rate is the relative price of a unit of the foreign representative agent's consumption basket to a unit of the domestic representative agent's basket. In equilibrium, prices (e.g., the real exchange rate) and quantities (e.g., aggregate consumption in the foreign and domestic economies) are jointly determined. Therefore, aggregate consumption cannot be the starting point in any model that endeavors to understand realized changes in the real exchange rate in every period. Instead, the starting point must be agents' endowments (or production), and the model must provide map between those endowments and their ultimate consumption baskets.
10 A model 9 Of course there may be asset markets, endowments (production technology), goods market frictions, and preferences over goods that could generate these equilibrium aggregate consumptions of the representative agents. Our point is that these elements are required to understand how aggregate consumption and the real exchange rate are jointly determined, but they are missing in many (if not most) of the recent papers in this literature.
10 Aggregate consumption and the aggregate endowment (production) must be equal in a closed economy without physical investment or government purchases, but they can differ in an open economy. Colacito and Croce (2011) start with agents' endowments. However, they assume complete home bias, so that there is no trade in the goods market or the asset market, and therefore an agent's consumption is the same as his or her endowment. Unfortunately, with complete home bias, the real exchange rate is not uniquely determined. Any real exchange rate clears the market since agents are assumed to have no desire to consume goods that they are not endowed with. Nevertheless, Colacito and Croce (2011) use the asset market view of real exchange rates in Eq. (7) to uniquely characterize the growth in the real exchange rate.
that starts with aggregate consumption is silent about this map and, hence, is silent on the mechanism that determines the real exchange rate.
It is worth emphasizing that standard asset pricing models that start with aggregate consumption can be useful for understanding cross-sectional variation in the average (or expected ) returns of different assets (including investments in nominal currencies) based on how those returns covary with the marginal utility growth of agents. Our point is simply that these models are not helpful for understanding realized changes in the real exchange rate each period (rather than average, or expected, changes).
Any model that purports to explain a real exchange rate must pass two simple diagnostics. First, the model cannot rely on complete asset markets to define the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate is the relative price of one basket of goods to another, and that relative price does not require asset markets to be complete. Therefore, any model must describe how the real exchange rate is determined, regardless of whether asset markets are complete or incomplete. Second, the level of the real exchange rate should be determined in the model (up to a constant that reflects the size of the baskets of goods that are being compared), and not simply growth (or changes) in the real exchange rate. If a model doesn't help us to understand the relative price of one basket of goods to another, then it doesn't help us to understand how the real exchange rate is determined. Models of the real exchange rate that rely solely on the asset market view in exchange rates in Eq. (7) fail both of these diagnostics.
An Endowment Economy
In Section 1 we showed that the asset market view of exchange rates in Eq. (7) is a first order condition that must be satisfied in any model, but it is not a substitute for a model. Marginal utility (aggregate consumption) growth does not determine the real exchange rate any more than the real exchange rate determines marginal utility (aggregate consumption) growth. A full-fledged model with the minimum necessary ingredients described in Section 1.4 is required to understand how aggregate consumptions and the real exchange rate are jointly determined in equilibrium. In this section we provide an example of such a model. The model is a generalization of Backus and Smith (1993) along three dimensions. First, we allow for preference differences across countries. Second, we allow for incomplete markets. Third, like Backus and Smith (1993) we have two goods, but we explicitly compare the case where the second good is nontraded to the case in which it is frictionlessly traded. We don't view this model as a solution to existing exchange rate puzzles, rather it is illustrative of our point about the joint determination of consumption and the real exchange rate.
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We describe an endowment economy with two countries ("home" and "foreign") and representative households within each country. Utility is defined over two goods, A and B. All goods are perishable and households live for two periods.
The representative household in the home economy has an instantaneous utility function
where c A and c B denote, respectively, the consumption of goods A and B by the home household, c(·) is a homogeneous of degree 1 quasi-concave function of its arguments, and u is a monotonic function with standard properties. Similarly, the representative household in the foreign economy has the instantaneous utility functioñ
wherec A andc B denote, respectively, the consumption of goods A and B by the foreign household, andc(·) is a homogeneous of degree 1 quasi-concave function of its arguments. Both economies are cashless and use good A as the numeraire. Our model would have the same implications for the real exchange rate if we chose different numeraires. Goods markets meet sequentially. Good A is frictionlessly tradable. We alternately assume that good B is frictionlessly tradable or nontradable. We let P B and P B denote the prices of good B in the home economy in the first and second periods. Similarly, we letP B andP B denote the prices of good B in the foreign economy in the first and second periods. When good B is frictionlessly tradable, its price must be the same in both countries,
The natural definition of the consumer price index (CPI) in the home country is a variable P such that c A + P B c B = P c(c A , c B ). Since c(·) andc(·) are homogeneous of degree one functions, it can be shown that there are homogeneous of degree one functions H(·) and H (·) whose form depends on c(·) andc(·), such that the home and foreign CPIs are:
Similarly the CPIs in period two are
Identical to Eq. (2) in Section 1, the real exchange rates in periods one and two are E ≡P /P and E ≡P /P .
In the special case where preferences are identical in the two countries, we have H(·) =H(·). If, additionally, both goods are traded, E = 1 = E , regardless of the asset market structure. If preferences differ across countries and both goods are traded, variation in the real exchange rate can arise even thoughP B = P B . All that is needed is variation in P B . We can make these statements even though we've said nothing about asset markets. This is one concrete sense in which the link between exchange rates and asset markets is tenuous.
As was the case in Section 1, we assume that there are k assets with k × 1 random payoff vector X. The k × 1 price vector today for these assets is P X . The payoffs and prices of the assets are measured in units of good A. The asset payoffs, and all variables in period two, depend on the state of the world in period two. For notational simplicity, however, we suppress the dependence of period two variables on the state of the world.
The household in the home country chooses c A , c B , c A , c B , and the k × 1 vector a, to maximize
subject to
Here 0 < β < 1, c A and c B are the household's current consumption of the two goods, c A and c B are the household's plans for future consumption of the two goods (in every possible state of the world), the jth element of a is the household's net purchases of asset j, and y A , y B , y A and y B are the household's current and future endowments of the two goods.
12 For details, see the section on price aggregation in the appendix.
Similarly, the foreign household choosesc A ,c B ,c A ,c B , andã to maximize
subject tõ
Herec A andc B are the household's current consumption of the two goods,c A andc B are the household's plans for future consumption of the two goods (in every possible state of the world),ã is a k × 1 vector whose jth element is the household's net purchases of asset j, and y A ,ỹ B ,ỹ A andỹ B are the household's current and future endowments of the two goods. The market clearing conditions for good A are
When good B is tradable we have the following market clearing conditions
When it is nontradable, instead, we have
The market clearing condition in asset markets is
Definition. A competitive equilibrium is values of the quantities c
c A ,c B ,ã and prices, P B , P B ,P B ,P B , and P X such that the quantities solve the home and foreign country optimization problems (taking the prices as given), and such that the market clearing conditions are satisfied. When good B is frictionlessly traded, Eq. (22) must also be satisfied.
Marginal Utility Growth and Risk Sharing
Our model always implies a simple relationship between the two countries' discounted marginal utility growths, or intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (IMRS), defined over aggregate consumption. We define these IMRSs as
Similarly, we can define the two countries' IMRSs over goods A and B:
Definition. Perfect risk sharing describes any competitive equilibrium in whichm A = m A andm B = m B in every possible state of the world next period.
Our definition of perfect risk sharing is the same as the one in Section 1. For any individual good, the IMRSs are equated across agents. For any identical basket of goods, suitably defined, the same is true. As we show in the Appendix, equilibrium in the goods market always produces the intuitive result that
Combining Eq. (37) with the definitions of IMRSs in Eqs. (34) and (35), produces
so thatm
In Eq. (39), Ξ = 1 whenever risk sharing is perfect in frictionlessly traded goods, and Ξ = 1 when risk sharing in those goods is imperfect. For example, when asset markets are complete, agents equate IMRSs across frictionlessly traded goods, and so m A =m A and therefore Ξ = 1. But in any incomplete markets setting, in general, m A =m A and thus Ξ = 1. Also, note that Ξ is the same for any frictionlessly traded good (or basket of goods). In particular, m B /m B =m A /m A ≡ Ξ whenever good B is frictionlessly traded.
Four Specific Examples
This section discusses four specific examples of our model. The four special cases we consider combine different assumptions about financial markets (complete markets vs. financial au-tarky) and goods market frictions (good B is frictionlessly traded vs. good B is nontraded). By explicitly solving for the equilibrium in these four cases, we demonstrate that marginal utility growths and real exchange rates are jointly determined by the laws of motion of the endowments, together with our assumptions about preferences, goods market frictions, and asset markets. We also illustrate a point we made in Section 1: The conditions under which risk sharing is imperfect, and those under which the real exchange rate varies, are different. We adopt the assumption that u(c) = ln c, and the consumption aggregates in the two countries are c = c B . These assumptions are useful because equilibrium prices and quantities can be worked out with pencil and paper. They imply that the CPIs in the two countries, measured in units of good A, are
. The real exchange rates in periods one and
We derive all of the solutions in detail in the Appendix. 
Complete Markets, No Goods Market Frictions
When asset markets are complete internationally and there are no goods market frictions (i.e., good B is frictionlessly traded), then P B =P B and P B =P B , and IMRSs in the individual goods are always equated across countries. As we show in the Appendix, in good A the IMRS is β/G A . In good B the IMRS is β/G B . Risk is shared perfectly, regardless of preferences.
In the case where preferences are identical, E = 1 and E = 1. When preferences differ across countries the expressions in Eq. (41) simplify to E = (ρ/ρ)P θ−θ B and E = (ρ/ρ)P B θ−θ , where
Hence,
Real exchange rate fluctuations are driven by differences in the global growth rates of the endowments of goods A and B. We see that if the global endowment of good A grows faster than the global endowment of good B, then good B's relative price rises. If the foreign country's preferences put more weight on good B than home country preferences (i.e.,θ < θ), then the foreign basket becomes relatively more expensive (the foreign country's real exchange rate appreciates).
Complete Markets, Good B is Nontraded
Now consider the case where asset markets are complete internationally, but good B is nontraded. In this case, in general, P B =P B . IMRSs in good A are always equated across countries: m A =m A = β/G A . IMRSs in good B are, respectively, m B = β/g B and m B = β/g B , so risk is not shared perfectly unless g B =g B in every possible state of the world next period. When preferences differ across countries the real exchange rates are given by Eq. (41), with prices given by
and
This implies that
Here, the real exchange rate depends on the relative growth rates of the endowment of good B in the two countries, but the two growth rates matter to different extents due to preference differences. Additionally, as was the case when good B was traded, if the foreign country's preferences put more weight on good B than home country preferences (θ < θ) then, other things being equal, the foreign county's real exchange rate appreciates when the global endowment of good A grows. If preferences are identical, then the real exchange rate in Eq. (41) simplifies to E = (P B /P B ) 1−θ and E = (P B /P B ) 1−θ with prices still given by Eq. (44), but Eq. (45) simplified
This means that
Here, the real exchange rate depends entirely on the relative growth rates of the endowment of good B in the two countries. If the endowment grows more slowly in the foreign country, its basket becomes relatively more expensive and its real exchange rate appreciates.
Financial Autarky, No Goods Market Frictions
The third case we consider is where no assets are traded internationally, but goods markets are frictionless. In this case, P B =P B and P B =P B in every possible state of the world next period. Risk sharing, in general, is imperfect. As we show in the Appendix, the ratio of IMRSs in the two countries is the same in goods A and B. That is
This expression is the same when preferences are identical, except that θ =θ.
In the case where preferences are identical, E = 1 and E = 1 in every possible state of the world next period. Risk sharing, on the other hand, can be good or bad. Suppose, for example, that the home country's shares of the global endowments vary and comove positively. In this case, Ξ deviates from one a lot, implying that risk sharing is limited. On the other hand, suppose that business cycles are strongly correlated across countries, so that the home country's shares of the global endowments do not change very much across different states of the world next period. In this case, Ξ will be close to one in all states, implying a high degree of risk sharing. When preferences differ across countries then E = (ρ/ρ)P θ−θ B
and E = (ρ/ρ)P B θ−θ , where
As in the case of complete markets, real exchange rate fluctuations are driven by differences in the growth rates of the two endowments. If the global endowment of good A grows faster than the global endowment of good B, then good B's relative price rises. If the foreign country's preferences put more weight on good B than home country preferences (θ < θ) then the foreign basket becomes relatively more expensive (the foreign country's real exchange rate appreciates). But the way in which the countries' shares of the global endowments fluctuate also matters for the real exchange rate. In the example we just described, the real exchange rate rises more in states of the world where κ > κ. This could reflect, for example, a rise in the foreign country's share of the global endowment of good A (a drop of s A ) at the same time as the global endowment of A rises relative to the global endowment of B.
Financial Autarky, Good B is Nontraded
The final case we consider combines financial autarky with the assumption that good B is nontraded. In this case, each country simply consumes its own endowments. IMRSs in the individual goods are determined by the country-specific endowment growth rates. For good A they are m A = β/g A andm A = β/g A . In good B they are m B = β/g B and m B = β/g B . Risk is not shared unless growth rates happen to coincide. The real exchange rates in the two periods are given by Eq. (41), with
Hence
Suppose endowment growth rates are identical across goods; i.e., g A = g B andg A =g B . Notice that this implies E = E . There is no variation in the real exchange rate. The extent of risk sharing, in contrast, depends only on whether g A =g A and g B =g B . It could be good or bad. Suppose, on the other hand, that risk sharing is perfect; i.e., g A =g A and g B =g B . We only get the result that E = E if θ =θ.
Discussion
Consider Table 1 from Section 1. It states that under complete markets, the observation that real exchange rates are variable only implies imperfect risk sharing when the two countries have the same consumption basket. In our model, the countries have identically-composed consumption baskets if and only if θ =θ, because θ andθ are the constant expenditure shares of good A in the two countries.
So suppose that θ =θ. Under complete markets, we saw that ln(E /E) = 0 and risk sharing is perfect if trade in both goods is frictionless. On the other hand, ln(E /E) = (1 − θ) ln(g B /g B ) andm B /m B = g B /g B if good B is nontraded. If one is willing to assume that markets are complete, and that countries have identical preferences, risk sharing and exchange rate changes are intimately linked in our model.
Under incomplete markets, however, there is no link, in general, between risk sharing and exchange rates, even when θ =θ. When θ =θ, and trade in both goods is frictionless, ln(E /E) = 0 yet Ξ can depart arbitrarily from one, and therefore risk sharing can be arbitrarily imperfect. When θ =θ, and good B is nontraded, ln(E /E) = 0 when risk sharing happens to be perfect (i.e., when g A =g A and g B =g B in every possible state of the world next period), but we also have ln(E /E) = 0 when risk sharing is "poor" and
More generally, our model illustrates that there is no direct link between the degree of risk sharing and real exchange rate variability.
Reduced Form Models
Finally, in this section we discuss the large number of papers in the recent international asset pricing literature that provide reduced form models of the domestic and foreign representative agents marginal utility growths. 
Complete Markets
To understand the economic motivation behind the reduced form approach in these papers, suppose that the asset returns completely span the representative agents' marginal utility growths. In this case, there are functions, m andm, of these asset returns, that are equal to Amy's and Bob's marginal utility growths,
Also, if asset markets are complete then Amy and Bob equate indirect marginal utility growth over dollars (i.e., Eq. 6, or equivalently Eq. 7, in Section 1.1 holds) so that mP/P =mP /P , or equivalently, E /E =m/m .
Papers in this literature directly specify m andm as reduced form functions of asset returns. They assume that m andm satisfy Eq. (54) and therefore interpret these functions as Amy's and Bob's marginal utility growths, respectively. These papers assume that asset markets are complete (a necessary, but not sufficient condition for Eq. 54 to hold) and therefore they also impose Eq. (55).
14 Any such reduced form model obviously does not contain the necessary ingredients that we provided in Section 1.4. Therefore, Eq. (55) cannot be used to explain or understand period-by-period growth in the real exchange rate. Moreover, m andm are functions of the asset returns, which include the growth in the exchange rate. Therefore, exchange rate growth cannot be both an input and an output of these reduced form models.
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There are at least a couple of reasons to question whether reduced form models of m andm can reliably be interpreted as Amy's and Bob's marginal utility growths, respectively. First, it is impossible to test, using only asset returns, whether those returns completely span Amy's and Bob's marginal utility growths. Of course, one can test whether a given m andm price the asset returns,
However, Eq. (56) certainly does not imply Eq. (54). 16 The second reason to give pause is that, even when asset markets are complete, the set of asset returns that are used to construct m andm in Eq. (54) must completely span agents' marginal utility growths. However, papers in this literature that provide reduced form models of m andm only use a very small subset of the assets that are available for agents to invest in. For example, the returns in these papers usually include nominal currency investments, as well as zero coupon bonds in two (occassionally more) countries or options on foreign currencies. Even if one accepts the assumption that asset markets are complete, one might reasonably expect that the set of assets that are required to span all agents' marginal utility growths also includes the major equity markets, other government bond markets, corporate bond markets, other foreign currencies, and perhaps even commodity and real estate markets.
Standard Approach with a Single SDF
It is instructive to compare the reduced form approach used in the recent international asset pricing literature with the standard approach to reduced form modeling of SDFs that is used in the broader asset pricing literature. Consider any set of dollar-denominated asset returns, R. If there are no-arbitrage opportunites in those returns then it is well-known that we can always find a stochastic discount factor (SDF), M > 0, that prices them
Given any reduced form model of an SDF, M > 0, that satisfies Eq. (57), we can always define m ≡ M P /P andm ≡ MP /P .
Eq. (55) therefore holds, by definition, with m andm defined from M by Eq. (58). Any reduced form model of m andm that also imposes Eq. (55), is mathematically identical to the standard asset pricing approach of providing a reduced form model of a single SDF, M > 0, that satisfies Eq. (57). The only difference between these two approaches is the economic interpretation that is provided in the papers that use them. In the standard approach, M (or equivalently, mP/P =mP /P when Eq. 55 is imposed) is typically interpreted as akin to the projection of all agents' indirect marginal utility growths onto the space of dollar denominated asset returns R. There is no attempt to identify M with any single agent, since it is well-known that this projection is the same for all agents (e.g., recall Eqs. 17-19 in Section 1.3). Neither this modeling approach, nor this economic interpretation of M , requires that the asset returns completely span agents' (indirect) marginal utility growths.
By contrast, the economic interpretation of m andm (or equivalently, M P /P and MP /P ) as Amy's and Bob's marginal utility growths does require that the asset returns completely span agents' marginal utility growths. If that assumption does not hold, then at least one of their marginal utility growths cannot be written as a function of those asset returns alone. Moreover, if the asset returns do not completely span agents' marginal utility growths, then Eq. (55) does not necesarily hold for general m andm that satisfy Eq. (56). In particular, recall from Section 1.2.1 that if m andm are the projections of Amy's and Bob's marginal utility growths onto the asset returns denominated in units of their respective consumption baskets, then, in general, E /E =m/m so that Eq. (55) does not necessarily hold.
Incomplete Markets
Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) provide reduced form models of m andm, which they interpet as the marginal utility growths of the domestic and foreign representative agents respectively. However, they assume that asset markets are incomplete and therefore do not impose Eq. (55). They use their model of m andm to price foreign and domestic zero coupon bonds. For example, if m andm both price a one-period (real) foreign zero coupon bond that costs b * today then
Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) note that Eq. (59) can be satisfied if
where E [O] = 1 and O is independent of m,m, and all assets. 17 They state that "the key insight of our model is that when markets are incomplete, the volatility of the exchange rate is not uniquely determined by the domestic and foreign stochastic discount factors." There are two problems with the reduced form approach in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) . First, if the asset returns do not completely span the representative agents' marginal utility growths, then at least one of their marginal utility growths cannot be written as a function of those asset returns alone. Therefore, it is logically inconsistent to interpret reduced form models of m andm as the marginal utility growths of the domestic and foreign representative agents, and simultaneously assume that the asset returns used to construct m andm do not span both of their marginal utility growths. Second (and irrespective of the specific economic interpretation of m andm), the assumption in Eq. (60) that O is independent of m,m, and all assets, introduces an arbitrage opportunity into their model. In particular, both m andm must also price a one-period (real) domestic zero coupon bond 17 See equation 24 on page 176 in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) .
costs b today, so that
However, this additional economic restriction in Eq. (61) reveals a contradiction (internal inconsistency) in their model, since (by Jensen's inequality)
That is, the model in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) is not free of arbitrage opportunities, since it assigns two different prices to the same zero-coupon bond.
Conclusion
The recent literature in international finance has used the asset market view of real exchange rates to explain and interpret a number of empirical properties of both real and nominal exchange rates. In this paper we showed that, alone, the asset market view of real exchange rates is not useful for understanding, or giving an economic interpretation to, changes in exchange rates. Instead, we argue that in order to explain how real exchange rates are determined, it is necessary to make specific assumptions about preferences, goods market frictions, the assets agents can trade, and the nature of endowments or production.
A Appendix

A.1 Aggregate Prices
The overall consumption aggregate for the domestic household is c(c A , c B ). Given a particular set of prices (in an arbitrary numeraire) for the individual goods, we can solve the household's static expenditure minimization problem
Because c(·) is a homogenous of degree one function, minimized expenditure is equal to P c where P = H(P A , P B ). The function H(·) is also homogenous of degree one in its arguments, and is related to the function c(·) [see Varian (1984) ]. The aggregate price index has the interpretation of being the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint at the optimum. To see this, notice that the first order conditions for the expenditure minimization problem are
Multiplying these through these conditions by c A and c B and adding up you get P A c A + P B c B = θc hence P = θ. We also have
establishing that at the optimum, H[c c A (·), c c B (·)] = 1. Of course, a similar approach may be used for the foreign household.
A.2 Overall Marginal Utility
The asset payoffs, and all variables in period two, depend on the state of the world in period two. For concreteness, in this appendix we assume that the state of the world is indexed by z ∈ Z = {1, 2, . . . , n}, with n finite. The assumption that the number possible states of the world in period two is finite, or even countable, is not important and is only for ease of exposition. By nesting the expenditure minimization problem described in Section A.1 within the domestic household's problem, we can rewrite the latter as follows. The household in the home country chooses c, c (z), and a to maximize
The first order conditions for c, c (z), and a are
Here λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (68), and µ(z) is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (69). So, combining (68) and (69), we get the following expression for the home household's marginal utility growth defined over its basket:
The household in the foreign country choosesc, {c (z)} n z=1 , andã to maximize
subject toPc
The first order conditions forc, {c (z)} n z=1 , andã are
Hereλ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (75), andμ(z) is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (76). So, combining (75) and (76), we get the following expression for the home household's marginal utility growth defined over its basket:
Notice that m is an SDF for payoffs and prices measured in home country basket units. This is because Eqs. (70) and (71) combined imply
Similarly,m is an SDF for payoffs and prices measured in foreign country basket units. This is because Eqs. (77) and (78) combined imply
From (71) and (78), the ratio ofm to m is
We define
Notice that since good A is the numeraire, the first order conditions for c A andc A , given in Eq. (64), along with Eqs. (68) and (75) imply that the time one marginal utilities of good A in the two countries are
Similarly, when these first order conditions are combined with Eqs. (69) and (76), we get expressions for the time two discounted marginal utilities of good A in the two countries: λπ(z) ] are the discounted marginal utility growths of good A in the two countries. Consequently,
with Ξ(z) =m A (z)/m A (z) being a measure of risk sharing in the frictionlessly traded good (good A).
The first order conditions for c B andc B , given in Eq. (64), along with Eqs. (68) and (75) imply that the time one marginal utilities of good B in the two countries are
Similarly, when these first order conditions are combined with Eqs. (69) and (76), we get expressions for the time two discounted marginal utilities of good B in the two countries:
Thus, m B (z) = m A (z)P B (z)/P B andm B (z) =m A (z)P B (z)/P B are the discounted marginal utility growths of good B in the two countries. Consequently,
is a measure of how well risk is shared in good B. If good B is frictionlessly traded the price terms in this expression cancel out and the measure of risk sharing in good B is also Ξ(z). When the securities span variation in households' marginal utilities (i.e., if financial markets are complete) the first order conditions for a and a become equivalent to
where µ is an n × 1 vector whose zth element is µ(z),μ is an n × 1 vector whose zth element isμ(z) and ψ is an n × 1 vector whose zth element is ψ(z), the price of a claim that pays one unit of good A in state z. Notice that when financial markets are complete, this implies m A (z) =m A (z) = ψ(z)/π(z) and Ξ(z) = 1.
A.3 Equilibrium in the Special Cases
To solve the model in the special cases we assume from the start that there is a complete set of state contingent securities indexed by z. Security z pays one unit of good A in state z and zero otherwise. It's price is ψ(z) in the home country andψ(z) in the foreign country. If there is international trade in these assets (the complete markets case), we have ψ(z) =ψ(z). Under financial autarky, the prices can be different. The first order conditions for the individual consumption goods and holdings of the securities are θc
(1 − θ)c −1
(1 −θ)c −1
We can rewrite the first order conditions for the consumptions, using the first order conditions for the securities, as:
Here, we have dropped the z = 1, . . . , n, from the equations for convenience.
In what follows we will use the notation L = λ −1 ,L =λ −1 . From Eqs. (100), (100), (100) and (100), we see that L andL are the households' respective total expenditures on goods in period one. We also define the global endowments:
We also use the following notation
A.3.1 When International Asset Markets are Complete
Here we have ψ(z) =ψ(z), which allows us to rewrite the first order conditions for the consumptions as
The home country household's lifetime budget constraint is
From Eqs. (108), (110), (108), and (110) we see that discounted marginal utility growth in good A in the two countries are equated:
From Eqs. (109), (111), (109), and (111), discounted marginal utility growths in good B are
A.3.2 When Good B is Traded
The market clearing conditions for good A are
These market clearing conditions, together with the first order conditions, (108)-(115), imply
Given a value of L we can solve the Eqs. (123) and (125) for L and P B :
If you combine Eqs. (123) and (124) you get
If you combine Eqs. (125) and (126) and previous results you get
Marginal utility growth in good B is
Marginal utility growths are across countries in both goods (but not across goods) are equated: m A (z) =m A (z) and m B (z) =m B (z). This is true regardless of preferences.
Identical Preferences If preferences are identical we have θ =θ so that Eqs. (128) be-
and Eq. (130) implies
Since trade is frictionless and preferences are identical E = E (z) = 1. We can solve for allocations by solving for L. To do this we consider the lifetime budget constraint, (116), and use the results (and notation) so far to write it as
This implies
Different Preferences With different preferences we need to solve for L. To do this we consider the lifetime budget constraint, (116), and use the results (and notation) so far to write it as
and (128) implies that
Given Eq. (130) we have
Since good B is traded,P B = P B andP B (z) = P B (z) so
A.3.3 When Good B is Nontraded
The market clearing conditions for good A are (119) and (120). For good B they are
The market clearing conditions and the first order conditions together imply that Eqs. (123) and (124) hold along with
Given the results so far, the lifetime budget constraint of the home household, (116), becomes:
(1 + β)θL = κY A , where κ = s A + βs A , and implies
If we combine Eqs. (123) and (146) we havẽ 
Combining Eqs. (144), (146) and (147) we have
If we combine (144) and (145), and make use of (148) we get
Therefore, we can write 
(1 − θ)L = c B P B (154)
θL =c A
(1 −θ)L =P BcB (158)
The home country's flow budget constraints must be satisfied with no asset holdings so we have c A + P B c B = y A + P B y B
c A (z) + P B (z)c B (z) = y A (z) + P B (z)y B (z).
Using the first order conditions for the consumptions we get expressions for discounted marginal utility growth: 
(1 − θ)L + (1 −θ)L = P B Y B
(1 − θ) L ψ(z) + (1 −θ)L ψ(z) = 1 βπ(z) P B (z)Y B (z) , z = 1, . . . , n,
We can rearrange Eqs. (165) and (167) to get:
We can rearrange Eqs. (166) and (168) to get:
The flow budget constraint, (161), and Eq. (170) imply that
The flow budget constraint, (162), and Eq. (172) imply that
Using (173) 
Substituting (173) into (169) we get
Substituting (174) into (171) we get
Given these results, discounted marginal utility growth in good A in the foreign country is 
Substituting (173) into (170)
Substituting (174) into (172)
Discounted marginal utility growth in good B in the two countries is 
Identical Preferences If preferences are identical we have θ =θ so that Eqs. (179) and (180) simplify to
Since both goods are frictionlessly traded and preferences are identical E = E (z) = 1. The expressions for ξ A andξ A in Eqs. (175) and (178) 
The expression for ξ B in Eq. (181) simplifies to ξ B (z) = 1, implying that
The wedge between marginal utility growths in good A, good B, and in terms of aggregate consumption ism 
ψ(z) π(z) = β/g A (z) (194)
L =ỹ A /θ (196) 
